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Footnotes
1. See, e.g., ABA Formal Opinion 462, “Judges’ Use of Electronic
Social Networking Media” (Feb. 21, 2013).
2. One of the most comprehensive and current examples is JAN L.
JACOBOWITZ & JOHN G. BROWNING, LEGAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL
MEDIA: A PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK, Ch. 8 (2017). Another is
“Social Media and Judicial Ethics,” JUD. CONDUCT REP., Vol. 39,
No. 1 (Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts., 2017).   
3. Id. See also Samuel V. Jones, Judges, Friends, and Facebook: The
Ethics of Prohibition, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 281 (2011).
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For many lawyers and judges, the use of social media canpose as many risks as rewards. With electronic communi-cation methods sometimes surpassing the use of more tra-
ditional methods, legal professionals have little choice but to
engage in some of the more popular social-media platforms,
such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter. 
Certainly, countless other communication methods exist
and will continue to be developed; however, like the afore-
mentioned trio, social media will likely always continue to
share several key traits, each of which will continue to pose
challenges for ethical communication among legal profession-
als. First, it is public—so public, in fact, that access spans the
globe. Second, it is immediate. When comments are posted,
they appear in “real time” and for all to see.  Finally, it is per-
manent. Even after deleting comments, photos, and hyper-
links, there’s no guarantee that they will not be copied before
they have been deleted, thereby leading to the possibility (no
matter how slim) that anything posted online can take on a life
of its own. 
Any one of these possibilities, viewed singularly, could cre-
ate enough ethical minefields to make even the most seasoned
practitioners take pause.  As a result, this uncertainty has
inspired myriad articles, seminars, and guides for “best prac-
tices” in maneuvering through the potential pitfalls involved in
social media where lawyers and judges are concerned.
Although the American Bar Association has published several
useful directives,1 clear guidelines have yet to be included in
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) or the Model
Rules of Judicial Conduct (MRJC). 
There are many valuable references that provide general
guidance on social-media usage for lawyers and judges,2 but
they fail to address yet another delicate component involved in
social-media ties—breaking them. Severing ties on social
media carries with it a variety of ethically sensitive considera-
tions, ones that involve rules of professional conduct, profes-
sionalism, and a skill that is becoming ever more nuanced—
tact. 
Several years ago, some states began to ban certain social-
media connections between lawyers and judges, thereby
requiring them to retroactively sever ties.3 But no advice was
given as to how best to do so. This article will address the
mechanics of severing ties on three currently popular sites, the
professional implications of severing social-media connec-
tions, relevant rules governing judicial and attorney conduct,
and a discussion of “best practices” for lawyers and judges to
follow when social-media ties must be broken.  
I. THE MECHANICS OF SEVERING TIES ON FACEBOOK,
LINKEDIN, AND TWITTER
Developing contacts is much easier than ending them.
Mechanically, the processes for doing so on Facebook,
LinkedIn, and Twitter are simple. Ethically and professionally,
this task can be nuanced and complex.
A. UNFRIENDING AND UNLIKING ON FACEBOOK
There are two ways to sever ties on Facebook—via the
“unfriend” and “unlike” features. The former is associated with
disconnecting from a user’s personal page, while the latter pro-
vides a way to sever ties from pages associated with companies,
clubs, groups, organizations, and other business-related pages
that belong to individuals. 
When one unfriends or unlikes, page owners are not noti-
fied; however, page owners and administrators are advised of
new friends and likes. Unfriending and unliking are most
noticeable on pages with the fewest friends and likes, or when
they involve users that page owners or administrators know
particularly well. 
Although it is likely that fleeting friendships and affiliations
routinely come and go among more junior or casual users,
such as minors and college students, and they may have hun-
dreds (and, sometimes, thousands) of friends and likes on
their pages, the same cannot commonly be assumed of lawyers
and judges. As a result, each disconnection could be much eas-
ier to detect, not only by page owners and administrators, but
also by other friends or visitors who might be monitoring
friends and likes on particular pages. In instances where con-
nections involve lawyers and judges, it may be awkward to
unlike and unfriend, even when directed to do so.
B. UNLINKING ON LINKEDIN
In contrast to Facebook and Twitter, LinkedIn is almost
solely used for professional purposes, including networking,
establishing and broadening contacts, joining professional
groups, and even job searches and “following” companies to
keep track of their news. As a result, affiliations tend to be lim-
ited to users who are less interested in participating in some of
the more personal features found on Facebook (e.g., posting
photographs, announcing one’s immediate whereabouts, etc.),
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and are instead more inclined to use the site to monitor career
transitions, read business-related news articles targeted to their
interests, recommend colleagues, and send emails. It should be
noted, however, that users may opt to link to their pages on
Facebook and Twitter so that posting a message on one plat-
form will automatically ensure the identical posting on the
other. 
Depending on the level of privacy selected on one’s profile,
it is possible for users who are linked to see others’ connec-
tions within their networks. In the most lax privacy option, a
user’s connections may be viewed by any LinkedIn user—both
inside and outside of the user’s immediate network. It cannot
be assumed that every lawyer and judge uses the most strin-
gent privacy setting; even if some do, this does not erase the
possibility that others will gain access to lists of connections
that were intended to have limited access. 
On LinkedIn, the unlinking process is as simple as clicking
a button. As with Facebook, there are no notifications sent
when links are broken.  
C. UNFOLLOWING ON TWITTER
Just as Facebook has added new words to the popular cul-
tural lexicon with “unliking” and “unfriending,” Twitter has
introduced the concept of “unfollowing,” which enables users
to cease receiving tweets from users they once “followed.” On
Twitter, a user’s followers remain public knowledge, particu-
larly for accounts used for business or professional purposes.
Twitter assists users in locating companies, schools, organiza-
tions, and public figures to follow, based on perceived interests
that stem from tracking accounts followed by users and others
in their networks. 
Lawyers and judges may have Twitter accounts that are used
for personal or professional purposes, and there are many arti-
cles and seminars that provide general guidance about the eth-
ical considerations involved in doing so. The same is true for
law firms, which, in small numbers, also use Twitter for firm
marketing and informational purposes. It is uncertain whether
these resources provide instruction about the potential compli-
cations that may be involved in severing ties. Rather, they
appear to be focused more on their formation and maintenance. 
Tweets are currently limited to 280 characters, but users
may send unlimited numbers of such updates on a daily basis.
A simple “unfollow” button is all that one needs to click to end
a connection. As with Facebook and LinkedIn, users are not
notified when this occurs.
II. SOCIAL-MEDIA DISCONNECTIONS AND THE MODEL
RULES
Because of the lack of notification when a user opts to end
a social-media connection, one could wrongly assume that sev-
ering ties would automatically be easier, less awkward, and
more socially graceful. On the contrary, this simple act can test
even the most experienced legal professional’s rudimentary
understanding of the concept of professionalism in the law.
Regardless of whether attorneys and judges are parting ways
through traditional or virtual channels, ethical expectations
are the same—or they should be.  The following sections will
address relevant rules in the MRPC and MRJC that may
directly or indirectly relate to severing social-media ties.
A. EXITING SOCIAL MEDIA
AND THE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
As previously mentioned,
social media is not currently
included in the MRPC. How-
ever, it is surprising to note that
the current rules do not include
any language or guidance about
lawyers severing ties with
judges or other lawyers in any
medium. Perhaps it’s thought
that parting ways is merely a
part of general communications, such as “hello” and “good-
bye”; it is more likely that such “goodbyes” were not previ-
ously envisioned. But times have changed, and social media is
no longer new. As a result, the absence of guidance in the
MRPC highlights a lack of clarity about modern expectations
of professional communication among legal professionals that
needs to be addressed and resolved.
The primary focus of communication in the MRPC, Rule
1.4, concerns a lawyer’s duties in reference to communications
with clients. Additional expectations concerning communicat-
ing with clients can be found in Rule 7.1; however, even in text
addressing client communications, very little, if any, guidance
exists to instruct lawyers on “best practices” or even basic
expectations for severing ties. With recent discussions in legal
education, media, and other sources about the lacking prepa-
ration of “practice-ready” lawyers, it cannot be assumed that
this skill has been mastered (or even addressed) simply
because one has successfully completed law study and has the
wherewithal to create a social-media presence. 
Absent clear-cut guidance, general participation in social
media may, in part, be governed by Rules 3.5 (Impartiality and
Decorum of the Tribunal), 8.4(d) and (e) (Misconduct), and
the various rules concerning advertising, along with the afore-
mentioned Rules 1.4 and 7.1. Yet another applicable section of
the MRPC is Rule 5.1, which addresses “Responsibilities of
Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers,” who are
charged with establishing guidelines for the professional per-
formance of junior lawyers. 
Additionally, there are some firms and managing partners
who may have established internal guidelines for attorneys to
follow when engaging in social-media activities. However,
absent guidelines from the MRPC, lawyers’ performance will
likely continue to lack consistency or uniformity, which can
cause confusion about expectations of best practices for
lawyers, judges, and others who are directly or indirectly
involved in the legal community, including clients, jurors, and
the general public. 
B. EXITING SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE MODEL RULES
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Much like the lack of coverage in the MRPC, the MRJC nei-
ther specifically addresses social media, nor provides guidance
for severing ties with lawyers or other judges. Indirect guid-
ance is contained in Canons 2 and 3, specifically in Rules 2.2
(Impartiality and Fairness), 2.4 (External Influences on Judi-
Regardless of
whether attorneys
are parting 
ways through 
traditional 
or virtual 
channels, ethical 
expectations 
are the same—or
they should be.
cial Conduct), and 3.1 (Extrajudicial Activities in General).
Additional guidance for performance in this area is found in
Rules 1.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary) and 1.3
(Avoiding Abuse of the Prestige of Judicial Office).
Of the scant number of directives in the MRJC related to
communication, most are focused on the interests of parties
whose cases are being heard in court proceedings. Although
traditional methods of communication have logically and his-
torically been left to judicial discretion—and, for the most
part, with great success—the public and uncontrollable
nature of social media calls for a different approach. Guidance
in entering into active participation in social-media commu-
nication, along with clearly defined rules for severing ties
with lawyers and others inside and outside of the legal com-
munity with whom judges may be linked, would provide
much-needed clarity about an increasingly important element
of what it means to serve as a judge in the new millennium—
and to do so in a way that deftly combines professionalism,
decorum, and accessibility. 
III. RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES FOR LAWYERS
AND JUDGES WHO MUST SEVER TIES ON SOCIAL
MEDIA
Although Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter do not advise a
user of broken connections, a lawyer’s or judge’s basic under-
standing of professionalism in the law should dictate the
importance of disclosure. Regardless of who is breaking the
tie—the judge or the lawyer—one should notify the other of
the intention to do so, along with the rationale. For casual
acquaintances, an email would be sufficient. For more per-
sonal connections, which, for this purpose, are limited to the
small number of one’s closest colleagues, a brief telephone
call or in-person meeting to discuss the reason for the
impending disconnection would be preferable, provided ade-
quate time exists to do so. However, considering the limited
amount of free time enjoyed by any legal professional, avail-
ability for personal advisories may be limited at best. An
email, though not preferred, would at least put close contacts
on notice of the need to sever ties so that they would know to
expect it, and an invitation to call or meet to discuss the mat-
ter could be included in the message. 
Although it is unlikely that anyone would take offense to
severing ties due to a mandate, there are also instances where
lawyers and judges opt to do so voluntarily. Examples may
include breaking ties because of changes in employment, disas-
sociations due to sanctions, or the ending of friendships. With
the exception of the last reason, advance notice of the intention
to sever the tie is the most professionally prudent approach. 
Lawyers and judges may wish to draft standard email lan-
guage to have on hand to use for this purpose, based on a
variety of reasons, with text that can be cut and pasted to suit
the occasion. They may also wish to cite to the opinion that,
in mandated instances, has caused the reason for the discon-
nection. As an example, in the case of Florida’s 2012 opinion
concerning connections between lawyers and judges on
LinkedIn, an email from a judge to a lawyer could read:
Although we have been connected on LinkedIn in
the past, and this connection has been beneficial, I
must reluctantly break all connections on this site with
lawyers who may appear before me, due to a recent
opinion issued in May 2012 by the Judicial Ethics Advi-
sory Committee of the Florida Supreme Court (Opinion
No. 2012-12). Of course, this does not alter our oppor-
tunities to interact collegially outside of social-media
channels. Understandably, the Committee is concerned
about mistaken impressions about judicial influence,
which I am sure you agree is essential for us all to pro-
tect. So that you are not caught by surprise, or left to
wonder why I have broken our connection, I am send-
ing this note as an advisory. Please contact me with any
questions.
A lawyer could send a similarly worded advisory to judges
in his or her network. Advance notice is far preferable to dis-
appearing without any explanation for doing so, and having
email text readily available literally takes seconds to employ,
while leaving positive impressions that will be recalled for the
duration of one’s career.
IV. CONCLUSION
Social media, in some form, is very likely here to stay. Cur-
rently popular sites, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter,
may come and go, but their commonalities (public, immediate,
and permanent) will form the bases for any social-media sites
that may replace them in the future. Yet another commonality
that these social-media sites share is the lack of notification to
users when a connection chooses to sever ties.  
No one engages in social-media activities planning to dis-
connect. On the contrary, the ultimate goals of becoming
involved in social-media activities on a professional level are to
strengthen and enhance current connections, develop new
contacts, and to establish an online presence that positively
solidifies one’s reputation in the legal community. 
Because lawyers and judges are held to a higher standard of
professionalism than the average social-media user, clarifica-
tion about best practices for disconnections between lawyers
and judges on social media has become a necessity. Such a lack
of guidance has the potential to create unnecessary confusion,
particularly in instances where the severing of social-media
ties is mandated. If such guidance were included in the MRPC
and MRJC based on the aforementioned general traits inherent
to social media, this would provide much-needed clarity for
years to come. 
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